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INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court’s sweeping decision in Citizens United v. FEC,1
scholars and reformers are scrambling to find new ways to limit the influence
of money in politics. In striking down prohibitions on corporations’ use of
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, the Citizens United
Court eliminated one of the major avenues used to limit the potentially
corrupting influence of money in campaigns.2 One area of the law left open by
the Citizens United decision is that of temporal restrictions on campaign
contributions. This Article examines limits on when during campaigns money
may be given and received, critiques the courts’ approach to this issue, and
proposes a new solution to efforts to limit the influence of money in politics.
Temporal limits on campaign contributions prohibit contributions during
certain time periods.3 Temporal limits may take the form of pre-election,
legislative-session, off-year, or post-election bans on contributions.4 These
restrictions are ostensibly enacted to prevent the flow of money to candidates
during time periods when contributions pose a unique threat of actual or
apparent corruption.5 Some courts have viewed these bans as contribution
limits, limiting the time when contributions may be made rather than the size
of contributions.6 Other courts, however, have categorized these restrictions as
expenditure limits, preventing a candidate from spending money by prohibiting
that candidate from raising money during a certain time period.7 This Article
examines the courts’ varying approaches to temporal restrictions on campaign
contributions and analyzes the benefits and burdens that different types of
temporal restrictions place on the three players in any campaign finance
question: the contributor, the candidate, and the government.
Because courts have found that the most effective temporal restrictions
stand on constitutionally infirm grounds,8 this Article presents a different
solution to the problem of restrictions on when contributions can be made and
received. While the legislative model proposed by this Article is novel, it
draws on existing systems, found to be constitutional, which seek to limit the
influence of money in politics for support.

1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 626–27 (Alaska 1999).
4. See id. at 628–30.
5. See id. at 619.
6. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Op. of the
Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 N.E.2d 213, 213 (Mass. 1994)); Alaska Civil
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 629.
7. See, e.g., Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1527–28.
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
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Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to temporal contribution
restrictions. Part II of this Article discusses the campaign finance framework
elucidated in Buckley v. Valeo.9 Part III of this Article examines the purposes
behind temporal limitations on campaign contributions and details the courts’
treatment of non-election (or off-year) bans, legislative session bans, and postelection bans. Part IV of this Article critiques the courts’ varying approaches
to temporal contribution restrictions. Part V argues in favor of variable
contribution limits based on the time contributions are made and received and
analyzes pertinent cases dealing with variable contribution programs. This
section of the article examines cases ruling on contribution bans based on the
identity of the contributor, and then reviews cases dealing with variable
contribution limits based on whether a candidate opts into a public campaign
financing program. Part VI of this Article briefly explains why the Supreme
Court’s 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC,10 striking down the so-called
“Millionaire’s Amendment” to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),
has no bearing on the analysis of variable campaign contribution limitations
discussed in this Article. This Article concludes by summarizing the critiques
of the courts’ varying approaches to temporal contribution restrictions and
reiterating the merits of the new model for campaign finance legislation
proposed in this piece.
I. TEMPORAL LIMITS
11

States, the federal government, and the courts have long recognized that
the use of money in campaigns can be limited because money may have a
detrimental effect on electoral processes.12 Money may, for instance, give—or
appear to give—large contributors unfair access to and influence over
candidates and office holders.13 Elected officials should serve the interests of

9. See generally id.
10. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
11. As used in this Article, the word “state(s)” refers to states and local jurisdictions,
including counties and cities.
12. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.
13. In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. . . . Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.
Id. at 26–27. See also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) (“Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns.”).
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all of their constituents, not just those who can and do give or spend money in
support of their candidacies. In order to stem the tide of actual or apparent
corruption, the government has endeavored to curb the influence of money
over politics—most commonly by limiting the size of contributions and less
frequently by prohibiting the making and receiving of contributions during
certain time periods.14
The majority of states and the federal government have concluded that
contributions over a certain dollar amount may give rise to actual or apparent
corruption and, hence, can be limited.15 Most limits on the size of campaign
contributions take the form of per-election limits, such that contributors are
prohibited from giving contributions over a certain dollar amount each election
cycle.16
Some jurisdictions have found that contributions made and received during
certain time periods give rise to increased fears of actual or apparent
corruption; those jurisdictions limit not the size of contributions but when
contributions may be given and received.17 For instance, off-year and postelection restrictions are enacted based on the belief that contributions given in
years when there is no election—or after the election is over—are more readily
seen as being given to gain access or influence, rather than for the election of
the candidate.18 States have enacted bans on contributions during legislative
sessions19 based on the belief that corruption or its appearance are more likely
to result when a contributor gives a candidate money while that candidate is
voting on an issue, which may directly affect that contributor.20 Temporal
contribution restrictions, therefore, shift the time when contributions can be
made or received, but do not affect per-election limits on the size of campaign
contributions.

14. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 628–30 (Alaska 1999); Ferre v.
State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1079–80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
15. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS
TO CANDIDATES (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/limits_
candidates.pdf.
16. Some states have imposed calendar-year, as opposed to per-election, contribution
limitations. See id.
17. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 626–27 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§
15.13.072(c), 13.074(c)(4) (1998)); Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1079–80.
18. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628; Ferre, 478 So. 2d 1077 at 1079–80.
19. Some legislative session contribution bans cover both incumbent and non-incumbent
candidates; others apply only to incumbents. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714,
722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (enjoining application of ban against non-incumbents). For further
discussion of session bans, see Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and
Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 121 (2008).
20. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1999).
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II. BIFURCATED BUCKLEY: CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS
Every type of campaign finance restriction, including temporal restrictions
on campaign contributions, is analyzed under the Supreme Court’s seminal
1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo.21 Buckley laid the framework for more than
thirty years of campaign finance jurisprudence. The courts have understood
the clear message of Buckley and its progeny to be that while contribution
limits are subject to a less exacting standard of review, expenditure limits are
subject to the strictest scrutiny.22 The level of scrutiny often determines the
validity of a challenged restriction.
The Buckley Court analyzed provisions in the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA) and held that both campaign contributions and expenditures are
speech.23 Hence, any restrictions on the ability to give or spend campaign
funds must pass muster under a relatively stringent First Amendment
analysis.24 Buckley, however, did not treat contribution and expenditure
restrictions in the same way.
The Buckley Court held that contribution limits, in contrast to expenditure
limits, present “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to
engage in free communication.”25 The Court continued, “[a] contribution
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but
does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”26 Put another
way, a contribution only says, “I support John Smith for City Council,” but
does not explain why. Contributions are seen as one link in the chain removed
from expenditures—the Court reasoned that contributions must, by definition,
be spent by someone else before they become pure speech.27
The Court held that a contribution limit “involves little direct restraint on
his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s
freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”28 In other words, supporters remain
free to voice their support of a candidate without contributing money.

21. 424 U.S. 1, 20–21, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449, 486–87 (2007).
22. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74–75; Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1524 (N.D. Fla.
1995) (suggesting looser standards for contributions).
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
24. The Buckley Court stated, “[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 20–21.
26. Id. at 21.
27. “While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an
association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” Id.
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
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However, with respect to a candidate’s right to receive contributions (as
opposed to a contributor’s right to give contributions), the Court held that
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if
the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing
the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”29 Contribution limits must
therefore be high enough to allow candidates to raise the funds needed to
competitively seek office.
Because contribution limits are seen as less burdensome on First
Amendment rights than expenditure limits, courts have subjected limits on the
size of campaign contributions to a standard of review less searching than strict
scrutiny. Contribution limits are upheld “if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
Courts have
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”30
consistently held that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is
an important governmental interest sufficient to uphold contribution limits.31
In contrast to contribution limits, the Buckley Court stated that because
“virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
requires the expenditure of money,” an expenditure limit on campaign funds
“necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
The Court stated that expenditure limits, as opposed to
reached.”32
contribution limits, present “substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints
on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”33
Hence, courts have subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny, such that
a limitation is upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.34 Given this heightened level of scrutiny, expenditure
limits are almost universally struck down on First Amendment grounds.35
In sum, Buckley held expenditure limits to be unconstitutional, finding that
they infringe on a candidate’s First Amendment rights without sufficiently

29. Id.
30. Id. at 25.
31. See, e.g., Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 26–27); N.C. Right to Life, Inc., v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 717 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley,
424 U.S. at 33); Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (N.D. Fla. 1995); State v. Dodd, 561
So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1990) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 496–97 (1985)); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
33. Id. The Buckley Court additionally found that expenditure limits do not serve to prevent
actual or apparent corruption the way contribution limits do. Id. at 53.
34. See id. at 45.
35. Expenditure limits have been upheld for candidates who accept them as a condition for
receiving public financing. Id. at 57 n.65.
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supporting the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance.36 The Court, however, upheld contribution limits under a First
Amendment challenge, finding that those limits directly support the
government’s interest in preserving the integrity of electoral processes and did
not unconstitutionally infringe on a contributor’s First Amendment rights.37
III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF TEMPORAL
RESTRICTIONS
Pursuant to Buckley, cases analyzing campaign finance restrictions—
whether they be contribution limits (either on the size of contributions or when
they may be given) or expenditure limits—require the balancing of three
distinct interests: the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance,38 a candidate’s supporter’s interest in demonstrating their
endorsement of a candidate by giving that candidate money,39 and a
candidate’s interest in raising and spending the funds necessary to effectively
advocate for herself in a campaign.40
This section of the article details key cases addressing temporal restrictions
on campaign contributions and explains how courts balance the pertinent
interests at issue.
A.

Non-Election Year Restrictions

Non-election-year or off-year fundraising restrictions prohibit or limit
campaign contributions during years in which there are no elections.
Typically, contributions are permitted starting approximately one year prior to
an election.41
Non-election-year campaign contribution restrictions are enacted for a
number of reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, non-election-year
limitations seek to decrease actual or apparent corruption.42 Contributions

36. Id. at 51.
37. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–28.
38. See, e.g., id. at 39; Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1528.
39. As discussed in depth below, the Supreme Court has held that restrictions on campaign
contributions are permissible, in part because they only present “a marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21. The Buckley
Court recognized that a more intrusive limitation on supporters’ rights might be impermissible
under the First Amendment. See id. at 20–21.
40. Acceptable contribution restrictions allow candidates to “amass[] the resources necessary
for effective advocacy.” See id. at 21.
41. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 N.E.2d 213, 214
(Mass. 1994).
42. See Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525; Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 637
N.E.2d at 217 (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1985)).
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given during non-election years can be, or at least can appear to be, made in
order to gain access or influence to the public official and not to help the
official get elected because the election is still far away.43
Second, these restrictions arguably reduce the natural advantages that
incumbents enjoy in an election. Research shows that incumbents, not
challengers, raise the vast majority of campaign funds in non-election years.44
This is partly the case because non-incumbent challengers generally do not
decide to run and start raising money until closer to the election.45 For this
reason, some scholars have argued that “[s]tudies documenting the advantage
that incumbents receive from prolonged fundraising seasons might be used to
breathe new life into off-year limits on contributions.”46
Third, off-year contribution limits can help candidates without a preexisting network of financial support to competitively run for open seats.47
When there is not an incumbent (in an open seat race), candidates typically
begin fundraising earlier in the election cycle than when there is an incumbent
running.48 This can create a disadvantage for those candidates who do not
have a pre-existing donor base;49 “candidates for open seats who have preexisting netwoks of financial support will retain considerable advantages.”50
Fourth, non-election year limitations allow publicly-elected officials to
focus on governing, rather than fundraising during the first portion of their

43. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 628 (Alaska 1999) (reciting
statistics showing incumbents receive a majority of non-election-year contributions and finding
this discrepancy “may imply a desire by those contributors to purchase access or influence”).
44. See, e.g., FEC, TABLE 1: OFF YEAR ACTIVITY OF 2008 CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS
(2008), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2008/20080407candidate/can2007sum.pdf.
45. Cf. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 580, 588
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (“[F]ew non-incumbents will decide to run for a particular office years in
advance of the election.”).
46. Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign Contribution Limits After
Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 690 (2008). Deborah Goldberg and
Brenda Wright have argued that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230 (2006), where the Court struck down contribution limitations as unconstitutionally low,
provides hope for proponents of contribution bans during nonelection years. Id. “The reasoning
of the plurality concerning the importance of electoral competition might, for example, provide
ammunition for spend-down provisions that restrict the war chests amassed by incumbents in one
election year to ward off electoral challenges in the next.” Id.
47. See Steven F. Huefner, Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less for More
Money?, 79 IND. L.J. 427, 446 (2004).
48. Cf. id. at 446 & n.115 (proposing that potential candidates fundraise earlier when
incumbents reach term limits).
49. Id. at 481.
50. Id. at 473.
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terms.51 Elected officials should be serving the interests of their constituents,
not dialing for dollars during years when there is no election.
Non-election year bans are typically struck down on First Amendment
grounds.52 While courts find that these restrictions serve a compelling or
important governmental interest53—the government’s interest in reducing
corruption or its appearance is routinely held to be the only interest sufficient
to uphold campaign finance restrictions—courts find that these restrictions are
not properly tailored to serve that purpose.54
For instance, in Zeller v. Florida Bar, a federal district court found that
there was not a “sufficient nexus” between a provision of the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, which barred solicitations for and contributions to judicial
candidates until one year before the election, and the government’s interest in

51. The current Buckley framework means that candidates must spend seemingly endless
amounts of time fundraising. See Vincent Blasi, Essay, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1994). See also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245 (2006)
(“Increased campaign costs, together with the fear of a better-funded opponent, mean that,
without expenditure limits, a candidate must spend too much time raising money instead of
meeting the voters and engaging in public debate.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I would leave open the possibility that Congress, or a
state legislature, might devise a system in which there are some limits on both expenditures and
contributions, thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties
rather than on fundraising.”); John C. Bonifaz et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal
Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 52 n.50 (1999) (recounting anecdotes about fundraising).
52. As discussed infra, in June 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a federal district court’s
denial of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction to bar the enforcement of a provision of
the City of San Diego’s campaign-finance ordinance that prohibited the making and accepting of
contributions prior to one year before the election. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, D.C. No.
3:09-cv-02862-IEG-WMC, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011), aff’g 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D.
Cal. 2010). The district court explained that “[w]hile temporal limits do burden free speech and
association, there is no evidence that the City’s limit is more than a minimal burden.” Thalheimer
v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. In addition, it should be noted that in 1982, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas clarified a previous per curiam order relating to provisions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 627 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1982). In that
previous order “no definite time limit was set within which a committee on behalf of a judicial
candidate could solicit and accept campaign contributions.” Id. The court found that “definite
time limits are required by the Code of Judicial Conduct and are necessary in order to provide
assurance of compliance with the per curiam order and the Code.” Id. The court held that
“campaign funds may be solicited and accepted on behalf of a judicial candidate beginning 180
days prior to the first election in which he is a candidate.” Id. However, this case does not
address the constitutionality of off-year bans, but rather merely clarified an order and should not
be read as standing for any broad constitutional principles.
53. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (citing FEC v.
Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)).
54. See, e.g., id. at 1526.
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preventing actual or apparent corruption.55 The court’s rationale hinged on the
fact that contributors could donate to judicial candidates within one year before
the election, but they could not give the same amount to candidates more than
one year prior to the election.56
The court additionally found that even if defendants were able to
demonstrate a nexus between the compelling state interest and the means used
to achieve that interest, the prohibition was not “narrowly tailored to avoid
abridgement of associational rights” because “blanket prohibitions on all
groups or individuals from making solicitations for and contributions to
campaigns are disfavored.”57 In other words, the court stated that it was
suspicious of the restriction at issue because it included a temporal ban, rather
than a temporal limitation.58 This is a theme that runs throughout many courts’
treatment of temporal restrictions.59 Courts are leery of provisions which ban
fundraising during a certain period of time, rather than merely limiting a
candidate’s ability to fundraise.60 This issue is addressed in the new temporal
contribution limit framework proposed in this Article in Part V.
The Zeller Court concluded that the prohibition on solicitations and
contributions to judicial candidates acted as an impermissible expenditure
limitation.61 Alaska viewed solicitations and contributions in a different light.
In 1999, in Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the Alaska Supreme
Court struck down two statutes banning “non-election year” contributions.62
The court, while acknowledging that the limits would affect a candidate’s
ability to spend money in non-election years, explicitly stated that the limits at
issue were contribution limits, not expenditure limits.63 In a footnote, the court
stated that “[u]ntil contributions are received, they are unavailable to
expend.”64 Hence, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union Court came to the opposite
conclusion as the Zeller Court on the issue of whether to treat temporal
contribution limits like limits on the size of contributions or limits on
expenditures.
55. Id. at 1525.
56. Id. The court distinguished another case, Ferre v. State, 478 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), on the grounds that the statute at issue in that case dealt with post-election
contributions. Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525 n.11. Ferre is discussed later in this Article. See
infra Part III.C.
57. Id. at 1526 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–93 (1978)).
58. See Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1526.
59. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
60. See id. at 1419.
61. Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1527–28.
62. 978 P.2d 597, 634 (Alaska 1999). Depending on the office sought, one statute
prohibited contributions prior to January 1 of the election year, and another statute prohibited
contributions prior to nine months before the election. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 629.
64. Id. at 629 n.188.
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The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that incumbents who received
non-election year contributions had a fundraising advantage over challengers.65
The court cited to Alaska Public Offices Commission reports, which showed
that from 1989 to 1995, 80% of nonelection year contributions were made to
incumbents, 3% were made to challengers, and 17% were made to candidates
for open seats.66 But, the court found that the evidence did not “rebut the
possibility that incumbents, whom voters had previously favored, and whose
political platform was previously successful, were more in tune with the
electorate or better organized than their challengers.”67
The Alaska Civil Liberties Union Court further acknowledged that the fact
that contributors in off years overwhelmingly gave to incumbents, as opposed
to challengers, “may imply a desire by those contributors to purchase access or
influence.”68 The court, however, required evidence that pre-election year
contributions far exceeded a candidate’s fundraising needs before it would
infer actual or apparent corruption.69 Put another way, the court required more
than a contributor’s desire to buy access or influence in order to find that the
contribution ban addressed corruption or its appearance. The court required
that the government show that incumbents were amenable to the desires of
contributors.
Not all courts, however, strike down such bans. In Thalheimer v. City of
San Diego, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction to prohibit enforcement of a ban on non-election year fundraising,
which applied to non-partisan candidates.70 The court recognized the “special
character of early campaign contributions,” acknowledging that such
contributions can gave rise to fears of actual or apparent corruption in a way
that contributions made near an election do not.71 Further, the court rightly
found that the temporal ban was merely a “minimal burden,” and burdened
speech rights less than the size limitations upheld in Buckley.72 The Ninth
Circuit correctly noted that the restriction did no more than ask candidates and
contributors to “rearrange their fundraising.”73 The court’s ruling also seemed
to hinge, at least in part, on deference to legislative judgments and “Plaintiffs’
scant evidence of harm.”74

65. Id. at 628.
66. Id.
67. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02862-IEG-WMC, slip op. at 4 (9th
Cir. June 9, 2011), aff’g 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id. at 25–26.
73. Id. at 26–27.
74. Id. at 29.
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Legislative Session Bans

Campaign contributions have been banned during legislative sessions in an
effort to curb the actuality or appearance of money for votes.75 Proponents of
these bans contend that contributions during legislative sessions are more
likely to lead to corruption or its appearance than contributions given when
legislators are not making decisions that could affect their campaign
contributors.76 Some bans cover only contributions from certain contributors,
such as lobbyists or government contractors, during legislative sessions.77
Political contributions from these individuals are seen to pose a unique risk of
actual or apparent corruption.78 Courts uphold only those legislative session
bans that apply to contributions from lobbyists and PACs, and not all
contributors.79
Courts generally apply strict scrutiny to legislative session bans and strike
them down as not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental
interest of preventing corruption or its appearance.80 Courts find legislative
session bans to be particularly intrusive, limiting the ability of candidates to
effectively advocate for themselves.81 For instance, legislatures are often in
session in election years, when it is most important for candidates to be able to
raise campaign funds.82
Courts have also found that these restrictions are not narrowly tailored
because they are purportedly both over- and under-inclusive. First, some
courts have found these restrictions to be over-inclusive because they apply to
all contributions, both large and small, while courts have generally held that
only large contributions raise the possibility of actual or apparent corruption.83
Second, courts have found legislative session bans to be over-inclusive because
they sometimes apply not just to incumbent legislators, but also to nonincumbent challengers or candidates for statewide office, who arguably have
little influence over the legislative process.84 On the other hand, courts have

75. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(overturning such a ban).
76. See, e.g., id. at 1420 & n.10; Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
77. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Inc., v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999).
78. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Ari Weisbard, What Albany Could Learn from New York City:
A Model of Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action, 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 194, 218
(2008).
79. See Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 717 (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)); Kimbell, 164 A.2d at 46.
80. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalona, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419–20; State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1990).
81. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
82. Cf. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266.
83. See, e.g., id. at 266 (distinguishing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
84. Id. at 267.
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found contribution bans during legislative sessions to be under-inclusive
because corruption can occur whether or not the legislature is in session.85
In addition, courts striking down legislative session bans have often held
that such bans unduly benefit incumbents, to the detriment of challengers.86
Incumbents have many natural advantages such as name recognition, access to
the media, and a pre-existing network of financial support.87 Courts have
found that in order to counter-balance those natural advantages, challengers
should not be prevented from fundraising during legislative sessions.88
In reviewing legislative session bans, some courts have added a step to the
strict scrutiny analysis. In addition to requiring that restrictions are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, these courts require the
government to prove that the restrictions address a real harm.89 Generally
speaking, these courts seem to require the government to come forward with
evidence of behavior sufficient to obtain a conviction for corruption.
In State of Florida v. Dodd, a frequently relied-upon 1990 case, the
Supreme Court of Florida struck down a ban on contributions to candidates for
legislative or statewide office during regular or special legislative sessions.90
In analyzing the temporal ban on contributions, the court began its analysis
with the oft-quoted conclusion that, with respect to certain temporal
contribution limits, the “governmental intrusion upon free speech and
association occurring in this instance is particularly grave.”91 Because the
court found the restriction to be particularly intrusive, it applied the heightened
standard of review applicable to expenditure limits.92
The Florida Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the
candidates’ ability to raise the funds necessary to run effective campaigns.93
The court concluded that the restriction at issue was not narrowly tailored
because the ban “prohibit[ed] all contributions and solicitations during a
crucial portion of [the] election year.”94

85. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122.
86. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalona, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419; State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 631
(Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265.
87. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 267.
88. See, e.g., Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419.
89. See, e.g., Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540,
551 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1420 (citing United States v. Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)).
90. 561 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 1990). The restriction did not apply to candidates for a vacant
office being filled by special election. Id. at 263 (citing FLA. STAT. § 106.08(8) (1989)).
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 264–65.
93. Id. at 264 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
94. Id. at 266 (second emphasis added).
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The court found the ban on contributions during legislative sessions was
not narrowly tailored to advance the government’s interest in preventing
corruption or its appearance for five reasons. First, the court noted that the
restriction applied to all candidates, including incumbents and non-incumbents
and candidates for legislative, executive, and judicial offices, while candidates
for non-legislative office, such as cabinet offices and the judiciary, could not
affect the legislative process.95 Second, the court noted that the restriction
could be extreme, because the legislature could be called into special sessions
lasting virtually the entire year.96 Third, the court stated that even assuming
legislative sessions lasted only two months per year, during this period
challengers would be severely prejudiced because incumbents would have
access to the press and free publicity, and challengers would be prohibited
from raising funds as a way of “counterbalancing” those advantages.97 Fourth,
the court found that corrupt campaign practices can occur at anytime,
regardless of whether the legislature is in session.98 The court noted that
legislative committees meet throughout the year and that lobbyists and other
special interests are often involved in those meetings.99 Fifth, the court found
the statute to be over inclusive because it banned candidates from spending
money on their own campaigns, an activity which the court stated could not
give rise to actual or apparent corruption.100
Hence, the Dodd Court likely would have looked more favorably on a ban
on contributions during legislative sessions if the ban: 1) only covered
incumbent legislators; 2) only pertained to regular legislative sessions and not
indefinite special sessions; and 3) allowed a candidate to spend money in
support of her or his own campaign.
The court stated that a “less-restrictive” means of achieving the same goals
existed and suggested that the ban apply only to certain organizations or
entities, such as lobbyists or government contractors.101 It is worth noting that
95. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court later noted that under the restriction, “underdog candidates dependent on a
steady trickle of small campaign contributions from private individuals may be choked out of
electoral campaigns for one-sixth or more of an election year.” Id. at 267.
98. Id. at 265–66.
99. Id.
100. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266.
101. Id. The court additionally noted that even if focusing a legislator’s attention on
legislative matters was viewed as a compelling interest (one of the arguments put forth by
appellants), there were less-restrictive means of achieving that goal, such as “punitive measures
that can be imposed upon inattentive legislators.” Id. The court further posited that “the political
process itself will tend to punish a legislator who fails to adequately represent the concerns of
constituents during a legislative session.” Id. Since Dodd was decided, it is close to universally
accepted that preventing corruption or its appearance is the only compelling governmental
interest sufficient to justify limits on the use of campaign funds, and that the government’s
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the court specifically recognized that there could be instances in which a state
law “prohibiting all kinds of campaign contributions for narrowly defined
periods of time in an election year” could be upheld as constitutional.102 This
may indicate that the court would have upheld a narrowly tailored nonelection-year ban.
In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, the Fourth Circuit upheld a
legislative-session ban on contributions by lobbyists and PACs to incumbent
legislators and challengers.103 The court noted that pursuant to Buckley,
contribution limitations are “constitutionally less problematic than are, for
instance, restrictions on independent expenditures.”104 The court explained
that the restrictions “do nothing more than place a temporary hold on
appellees’ ability to contribute during the General Assembly session, leaving
them free to contribute during the rest of the calendar year and to engage in
political speech for the entire year.”105
The court found that the restrictions passed muster under strict scrutiny.106
With respect to the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance, the court held that corruption is not limited to that which “results
from the large contributions of individuals” but rather that “[c]orruption, either
petty or massive, is a compelling state interest because it distorts both the
concept of popular sovereignty and the theory of representative
government.”107 The restrictions addressed the risk of actual corruption, the
court found, because “[i]f lobbyists are free to contribute to legislators while
pet projects sit before them, the temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political
favors’ can be powerful.”108 The court additionally stated that the restrictions

interest in focusing a legislator’s attention on legislative matters is not sufficient to uphold
contribution limits. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999)
(quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conserv. Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)).
102. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265.
103. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 718. It is important to note that courts have upheld complete bans
on contributions by lobbyists. See, e.g., Preston v. Leake, 743 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.C. 2010)
(upholding statute prohibiting registered lobbyist from making campaign contributions to
candidates for statewide office).
104. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 715 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court stated, “Legislative action which is procured directly through gifts, or even
campaign contributions, too often fails to reflect what is in the public interest, what enjoys public
support, or what represents a legislator’s own conscientious assessment of the merits of a
proposal.” Id.
108. Id. at 716 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985)). The court elaborated:
While lobbyists do much to inform the legislative process, and their participation is in the
main both constructive and honest, there remain powerful hydraulic pressures at play
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addressed the risk of apparent corruption because contributions from PACs and
lobbyists during legislative sessions could be particularly corrosive.109
The Bartlett Court held that the restrictions were narrowly tailored for two
reasons. First, they were “limited to lobbyists and the political committees that
employ them—the two most ubiquitous and powerful players in the political
arena.”110 Indeed, “the heart of Bartlett’s reasoning, which is directly relevant
to any campaign finance restriction targeted at lobbyists, is that lobbyists
present a special threat to the integrity of the political process, a threat which is
compounded while the legislature is in session.”111 Second, the restrictions
were applied only during legislative sessions, which typically covered only a
portion of the year.112
Further, the court found unpersuasive Appellees’ three primary arguments
as to why the statute should fail. First, with respect to the contention that the
limitations were not narrowly tailored because they cover both large and small
contributions, the court responded, quoting Buckley, that a “‘court has no
scalpel to probe’ such fine distinctions.”113 Regardless of the size of a
contribution, the court found, “the appearance of corruption may persist
whenever a favorable legislative outcome follows closely on the heels of a
financial contribution.”114 Second, with respect to Appellees’ argument that
the restrictions were not narrowly tailored because they covered nonincumbent candidates who cannot “sell legislative outcomes,” the court
responded that contributions to incumbents are not the only way to gain
beneficial treatment, that “sticks can work as well as carrots,” and that
threatened contributions to an incumbent’s challenger could produce the same
effect as a direct contribution to an incumbent.115 Third, with respect to
Appellees’ argument that the restrictions are particularly harmful for
challengers because they cut off a funding source in the months leading up to a
primary or general election, the court said that this argument had been rejected

which can cause both legislators and lobbyists to cross the line. State governments need
not await the onset of scandal before taking action.
Id.
109. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716. The court further provided that it was well within North
Carolina’s power to take measures to make sure the appearance of corruption “does not
undermine public confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.” Id.
110. Id. “[C]ontributions by lobbyists directly involved in the legislative process to
legislators while the legislature is actively considering legislation may create a particularly acute
appearance problem.” Briffault, supra note 19, at 124.
111. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122.
112. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716.
113. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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in Buckley, where, as in Bartlett, limits applied equally to incumbents and
challengers.116
C. Post-Election Bans
States and the federal government enact post-election contribution
limitations for the same reasons that they enact other temporal contribution
limitations—to decrease actual or apparent corruption.117 Contributions given
right after an election (at least those contributions given to successful
candidates) are, or may appear to be, given in order to obtain access and
influence more than contributions given before an election, which are needed
for a candidate to raise the funds necessary to run a competitive campaign.118
Some courts have also found that post-election bans allow the public to know
the source of a candidate’s campaign funds before the election.119 Further,
right after an election, elected officials should be governing, not running for
election. Post-election bans are generally upheld against First Amendment
challenges.
In 1985, in Ferre v. State of Florida ex rel. Reno, the Florida Court of
Appeals upheld a statute banning the acceptance and requiring the return of
post-election contributions under a First Amendment challenge.120 The court
employed the lower level of review generally applicable to contribution
limits.121 The court found two sufficiently important interests advanced by the
statute: 1) preventing corruption or its appearance; and 2) informing the public
of the identity of campaign contributors before an election.122 The provision

116. Id. at 716–17 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31). The Buckley Court also disagreed with
Plaintiffs’ claim that fundraising is always more difficult for challengers, stating that “‘majorparty challengers as well as incumbents are capable of raising large sums for campaigning’ and
that ‘a small but nonetheless significant number of challengers have in recent elections outspent
their incumbent rivals.’” Id. at 717 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 32). The Buckley Court
additionally noted that legislators would be weary of passing campaign finance reforms if they
treated incumbents and challengers differently. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33).
117. See, e.g., Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2004); State v. Alaska Civil
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630 (Alaska 1999); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077,
1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
118. See Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1079–80. It should be noted that some post-election campaign
contributions are given to help candidates pay off debts from previous elections.
119. Id. at 1080.
120. Id. at 1081.
121. Id. at 1079 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
122. Id. at 1081. It is important to note that the Ferre opinion is a relatively old case in the
area of campaign finance law, twenty-five years old, and arguably preventing corruption or its
appearance is now viewed as the only sufficiently important and/or compelling interest sufficient
to uphold contribution restrictions. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th
Cir. 1999) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1985)). Therefore, it is not entirely clear how the Ferre Court would address Plaintiffs’
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was designed to prevent candidates from being able to hide the identity of their
contributors by waiting to make large expenditures until right before the
election with the knowledge that potentially unpopular contributors would give
post-election contributions to pay for those expenditures.123
IV. CRITIQUING THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF TEMPORAL CONTRIBUTION
RESTRICTIONS
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckley, limitations on the
time when campaign contributions can be made or received should be subject
to the same level of scrutiny as limitations on the size of campaign
contributions. Courts should ask only if a temporal restriction is closely drawn
to achieve a substantial state interest, rather than demanding that the restriction
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.124 Some temporal
contribution limitations may be overly restrictive and fail under this standard;
others will properly be upheld under this more lenient standard of review.
Some temporal contribution limitations, for instance, should be upheld because
they are not as restrictive on the First Amendment rights of candidates and
contributors as expenditure limits, and they strongly support the government’s
interest in preventing corruption or its appearance.
While courts have faithfully applied Buckley to limitations on the size of
campaign contributions, subjecting those limits to the lower level of review,
some courts have viewed restrictions on when contributions can be made and
received as expenditure limits in disguise and, hence, have subjected those
restrictions to strict scrutiny.125 Recent Supreme Court precedent,126 discussed
below, supports the argument in this Article that all contribution restrictions,
whether limits or bans and whether limiting the size of contributions or the
time when they can be given and received, should be subject to a lower level of
scrutiny.
In FEC v. Beaumont, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a ban
on contributions should be subject to strict scrutiny because the statute limited

argument that there were less restrictive ways to prevent actual or apparent corruption. However,
there is evidence to suggest that the court’s opinion would be the same, as it specifically stated
that the statute was “reasonably” designed to serve both governmental interests, and the statute
caused only a “minimal” affect on First Amendment rights.
123. See Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1080 n.10.
124. As discussed in this Article, despite the contention of some that limitations on when
contributions can be made are reasonable “time, place or manner” restrictions, this Article
explains that, pursuant to Buckley, it is settled law that such limitations are analyzed under the
“closely drawn” standard of review.
125. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Op. of the
Justices to the House of Reps., 637 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Mass. 1994).
126. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
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contributions based on their source.127 The Court held that “the level of
scrutiny is based on the importance of the ‘political activity at issue’ to
effective speech or political association,”128 and contributions are subject to a
lower level of scrutiny because they result in political expression only if spent
by someone else.129 Significantly, the Court stated that “[i]t is not that the
difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to
consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the
standard of review itself.”130 The Court upheld the ban, partly because
corporations remained free to establish separate segregated funds (also known
as PACs) to make contributions and expenditures in connection with
elections.131 Similarly, with respect to temporal bans, contributors remain free
to give contributions when the temporal bans are not in place.
A.

The Effect of Temporal Restrictions on the Government, Contributors, and
Candidates

By viewing temporal restrictions on campaign contributions as expenditure
limits, courts misperceive the benefits and burdens that these restrictions place
on the government, contributors, and candidates. Courts overemphasize the
burden these restrictions place on candidates and contributors and
underestimate the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance.
1.

The Government’s Interest in Imposing Temporal Contribution
Restrictions

When analyzing temporal contribution restrictions, courts should recognize
that when elections are years away, for instance, more than half an election
cycle away, the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance trumps a candidate’s right to raise campaign funds.132 As the
election approaches, however, the candidate’s need to raise campaign funds
increases, and the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its

127. Id. at 161.
128. Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)).
129. Id. 160–62 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976)).
130. Id. at 162.
131. See id. While the Court’s ultimate conclusion in Beaumont may be called into question,
as a result of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), there is no reason to
question the Court’s reasoning concerning the proper level of review to be applied to campaign
finance restrictions.
132. Cf. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 628 (Alaska 1999) (examining
the argument that contributions “remote in time” to an election are more susceptible to the
appearance that they were made to “purchase influence”); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d
1077, 1079 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that government interests outweighed
candidates’ opposition to post-election bans).
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appearance decreases proportionately;133 contributions made closer in time to
an election are more clearly made to support a candidate’s election, rather than
to gain access or influence over an incumbent, or punish an incumbent by
giving to a challenger.134
2.

The Burdens that Temporal Contribution Restrictions Place on
Contributors

Many courts have overestimated the burden that temporal restrictions place
on a candidate’s supporters. Contributors are not prohibited from supporting
their favorite candidate under statutes imposing temporal contribution bans,
they are merely asked to postpone direct campaign contributions until those
bans are lifted, generally until closer to the election. Supporters remain free to
show support for candidates through means that do not require the use of
money, such as by creating websites that extol a candidate’s virtues. In
addition, supporters can use funds to make independent expenditures
supporting or opposing candidates at any time,135 although such expenditures
are typically made later in election cycles.
3.

The Burdens that Temporal Contribution Restrictions Place on
Candidates

Courts view temporal bans on campaign contributions, as opposed to limits
on the size of contributions, as particularly grave because they cut off a
candidate’s primary (or only) source of funding during a certain time period.136
However, it is not the case that all temporal contribution bans unduly burden
the speech rights of political candidates. At the outset, when analyzing the free
speech rights of a candidate, whose aim is by definition to win an election, the
pertinent time period is the entire election cycle and not a small snapshot of
that cycle. With that time period in mind, it is important to note that a
temporal ban on campaign contributions could actually reduce the total amount
of funds that a candidate can raise each election cycle less than limits on the
size of individual contributions could reduce that total amount.137 Put another
way, depending on the length of the temporal ban, such a ban could pose less

133. Cf. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628.
134. Cf. id.
135. Briffault, supra note 19, at 123–24.
These expenditures include, inter alia,
electioneering communications and issue advertisements.
136. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
137. See Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995) (holding that a legislative session
ban on lobbyists to legislators was less restrictive than the dollar limits upheld in Buckley). See
also Briffault, supra note 19, at 124. (“Depending on the length of the legislative session, a
temporal restriction could be less burdensome to both lobbyist-donors and the candidates they
would support than the monetary ceilings on contributions . . . .”).
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of a burden to candidates (and contributors) than a monetary limit on
individual contributions.
Limitations on the size of campaign contributions, however, are routinely
upheld, while limitations on when contributions can be made or received are
often struck down.138 Courts have found that limits on the size of contributions
do not restrict what candidates can spend, but merely force candidates to seek
out more donors to be able to spend the same amount of money.139 There is
little reason to believe that the genuine supporter of a candidate would not wait
to give a campaign contribution until close in time to the election. In this way,
temporal bans on campaign contributions may merely shift the time when
funds are given and may not reduce the overall funds that candidates can raise
each election cycle.
Candidates should, by definition of their status as candidates, be allowed to
raise those funds necessary to run competitive campaigns for office.140
Candidates need not, however, be allowed to raise the funds necessary to
amass large campaign war chests early in an election cycle. Courts have
worried that temporal campaign contribution limits discriminate against nonincumbent challengers because incumbents possess natural advantages like
name recognition, free access to the media, and a pre-existing network of
financial support, whereas challengers purportedly need to raise funds early in
the election cycle to counteract those advantages.141 In reality, however, most
challengers do not decide to run for office and, hence, do not begin raising
campaign funds until later in the election cycle than incumbents do.142 In this

138. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (upholding contribution limits);
Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525 (striking temporal limits).
139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 n.27.
140. Wealthy self-funded candidates may possess the funds necessary to run competitive
campaigns without the need to raise any campaign contributions.
141. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122 (citing Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D.
Tenn. 1996); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990)).
142. In Service Employees International Union, a federal district court found that “few nonincumbents will decide to run for a particular office years in advance of the election. Even if they
do, they will have significant trouble in raising money early in the election cycle.” Serv. Emps.
Int’l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 580, 588 (E.D. Cal. 1990). The
court elaborated:
In state races in the off-years 1983, 1985, and 1987, all incumbents, but very few
challengers, engaged in fundraising. The average incumbent also substantially outraised
the challengers who did raise money in the off-year. In statewide constitutional office
races in the off-years 1983 and 1985, incumbents outraised challengers by an average of
almost 9 to 1. In State Senate races in the off-years . . . , incumbents outraised challengers
by an average of more than 40 to 1. In State Assembly races in the off-years . . . ,
incumbents outraised challengers by an average of more than 70 to 1.
Id. at 588 n.17 (omissions in original). In a given election cycle, incumbents will typically raise
significantly more funds than non-incumbents. See, e.g., FEC, supra note 44.
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way, temporal limitations on campaign contributions could actually benefit
challengers because challengers will not face incumbents who have amassed
large campaign funds early in the election cycle.143 In addition, while some
courts have found that challengers should not be subject to temporal campaign
contributions limits because they wield little power over governmental
processes, a campaign contribution to an incumbent’s opponent could
conceivably affect an incumbent as much as a contribution made directly to
that incumbent.144 A carrot may, indeed, be as effective as a stick.145
B.

The Over- and Under- Inclusiveness of Temporal Contribution
Restrictions

Arguably as a result of the fact that some courts categorize temporal
restrictions on campaign contributions as expenditure limits in disguise and,
therefore, apply strict scrutiny to those restrictions, courts have found that
temporal contribution limits are not properly tailored to achieve the goal of
preventing corruption or its appearance and are both over- and underinclusive.146 Courts find such restrictions to be over-inclusive because they
apply to both small and large contributions, while purportedly only large
contributions have been found to give rise to actual or apparent corruption,147
and because they apply to non-incumbents,148 who arguably have little control
over governmental decisions. Courts have also found temporal restrictions to
be under-inclusive because “corruption can occur at any time.”149 The answer
to all of these assumptions is essentially the same. Contributions given during
certain time periods (whether big or small and whether given to challengers or
incumbents)—for instance in the first half of an official’s term—give rise to
increased fears of corruption, and therefore, the government has a strong
interest in limiting those contributions.
Temporal contribution limits are not necessarily over- or under-inclusive.
First, even small contributions may, in some instances, be banned. As the
Fourth Circuit stated when upholding a contribution ban on lobbyists during

143. It is possible, however, that incumbents could carry over funds from a previous election
cycle. For this reason, this Article suggests that candidates be prohibited from carrying over
funds raised in past elections.
144. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527–28 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
147. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976). As discussed in more depth later in
this Article, and as one anti-reform advocate has argued, “Temporal bans also restrict both large
and small contributions and are therefore constitutionally suspect.” James Bopp, Jr.,
Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 235, 265 (1998).
148. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
149. Bopp, supra note 147, at 265 n.167 (quoting Ark. Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29
F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
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legislative sessions, “corruption, either petty or massive, is a compelling state
interest.”150 The Fourth Circuit correctly found that the appearance of
corruption can arise from small contributions “when[] a favorable legislative
outcome follows closely on the heels of a financial contribution.”151 Nor is it
the role of the courts to parse through a statute, discarding certain limits as too
low and approving other limits as just high enough.152 Courts owe the
legislature some level of deference in this area. Second, contributions to an
incumbent’s opponent may affect that incumbent, although arguably not as
much as a direct contribution to that incumbent.153 The mere threat of
donations to non-incumbent challengers could cast the same pallor of
corruption.
Third, it is no answer to the fact that corruption can occur at any time to
say that contributions cannot be more severely restricted or even banned during
times when the fear of corruption is at its height; “Of course, legislation is not
rendered unconstitutional merely because it proscribes more narrowly rather
than more broadly.”154 Further, “a regulation is not fatally underinclusive
simply because an alternative regulation, which would restrict more speech or
the speech of more people, could be more effective.”155
C. Temporal Contribution Restrictions and Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions
While some courts have erroneously categorized temporal contribution
restrictions as expenditure limits in disguise and, hence, have subjected those
limits to a standard of review more searching than the standard typically
applied to limits on the size of contributions, courts should not further lower
the level of scrutiny to match the one applied to “time, place, and manner”
restrictions.156 This argument that any type of campaign contribution limit
150. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716.
151. Id.
152. Cf. id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30).
153. Id.
154. Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1080 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
155. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
156. Some have even argued that certain campaign contribution limits, whether temporal or
not, should be subject to scrutiny under the time, place, and manner analysis. Courts have
generally rejected such arguments. In 1993, in Barker, the court reviewed a law preventing
lobbyists from volunteering personal services to candidates. Barker v. Wis. Ethics Bd., 841 F.
Supp. 255, 256 (W.D. Wis. 1993). The law prevented lobbyists from giving, aside from money,
“any other thing of pecuniary value.” Id. at 258. Defendants argued that the court should use the
standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. The court specifically stated, “this
case is not about a time, place or manner restriction. It addresses a direct prohibition on a
protected activity . . . .” Id. at 259. Similarly, in Kruse, the court reviewed an ordinance
imposing expenditure limits by city council candidates and rejected Cincinatti’s argument that the
ordinance was justified as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. Kruse v. City of
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could be subject to that lower level of review was explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Buckley.157 Since Buckley, it is settled law that restrictions
on campaign contributions and expenditures (whether in amount or by time)
“impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association
by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions otherwise imposed.”158 The
Buckley Court contrasted time, place, and manner restrictions—such as a
volume restriction on sound trucks—with contribution and expenditure
limits.159 Whereas the sound truck could still deliver its message, contribution
and expenditure caps impermissibly “restrict the extent of the reasonable use”
of virtually every communication medium.160
Courts have consistently avoided applying the the standard of review
applicable to time, place, and manner restrictions to temporal contribution
restrictions. In Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno,161 the Florida Court of Appeals
reviewed statutes banning post-election contributions. The court assumed that
the statutes imposed a heavier burden on First Amendment rights than time,
place, and manner restrictions.162 The state argued that the statute merely
limited the time when contributions could be made.163 Appellee countered that
the laws banned, rather than delayed, speech.164
Similarly, in Gable v. Patton, the Sixth Circuit cited Buckley for the
proposition that a restriction was not merely a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction, because “[i]t [could not] be seriously argued that the
prohibition at issue does not restrict the quantity of political speech.”165 The
statute at issue prevented candidates who did not participate in a public
financing program from spending their own funds to support their campaigns
twenty-eight days before an election.166
In sum, courts have failed to properly balance the interests of the
government, contributors, and candidates when analyzing temporal restrictions
on campaign contributions. Some courts have erroneously applied strict
scrutiny, applicable to expenditure limitations, to temporal restrictions. In

Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909, 918 (6th Cir. 1998). But see Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103
F.3d 1240, 1253–54 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding consent provision under intermediate scrutiny
standard).
157. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1976).
158. Id. at 18.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 18 n.17.
161. Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1078–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
162. Id. at 1079.
163. Id. at 1079 n.7.
164. Id.
165. 142 F.3d 940, 953 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
166. Id.
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addition, and perhaps as a result, some courts have incorrectly viewed these
restrictions as under- or over-inclusive.
V. VARIABLE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
Recognizing that courts may not change the way they analyze temporal
contribution bans, this Article presents an alternative solution to the problem of
limiting the flow of money to candidates during certain time periods. This
Article posits that because courts are more likely to uphold temporal
contribution limits rather than bans, instead of prohibiting fundraising during
certain periods of time, contribution limits should be lowered during those
periods to allow for limited fundraising. States and the federal government
should enact campaign finance programs that contain variable contribution
limits, allowing for higher limits right before an election, when candidates
need more funds to advocate effectively for themselves and lower contribution
limits when elections are years away and the risk of actual or apparent
corruption from contributions may be higher. Specifically, this Article
suggests that contributions be lowered to a third of normal levels for the first
half of an election cycle. Overall election cycle limits would remain the same,
but contributors would be able to give less in the first years of the election
cycle. For instance, if a candidate for a four-year term in elected office was
subject to a $2400 per election individual contribution limit, contributors could
give that candidate up to $800 in the first half of the election cycle and the
remaining $1600 in the second half of the cycle. Alternatively, contributors
could wait until the last two years of the election cycle and give $2400 at that
time.
Very few variable contribution limits based on time currently exist.
Legislators often enact and courts routinely uphold two other types of variable
contribution limits based on: 1) the identity of the contributor (such as
lobbyists, government contractors or PACs);167 and 2) whether the candidate
accepts public financing or opts out of such a system.168 In both cases,
contributions of varying sizes are justified based on increased or decreased
fears of corruption.169
The same logic, employed to justify variable contribution limits based on
the identity of the contributor or whether the candidate accepts public

167. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999). Under
most laws which place different restrictions on certain contributors based on increased fears of
corruption, those contributors are prohibited from giving any money at all, while the rest of the
public can give up to the applicable contribution limit. Hence, those contribution limits vary
from $0 to whatever the contribution cap is.
168. See, e.g., Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 37 n.13 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing
Rhode Island laws).
169. Id. at 39; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 614.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

TIMING IS EVERYTHING

879

financing, applies to variable contribution limits based on when contributions
are given and received. Contributions in the first half of an election cycle pose
special risks to the integrity of the political system that give rise to actual or
apparent corruption, while contributions given later in election cycles are more
easily seen as intended for the election or defeat of a candidate and are
necessary for candidates to be able to wage competitive campaigns.
At least one statute setting different contribution limits for election and
non-election years has been upheld.170 In 2005, in Minnesota Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, the Eighth Circuit ruled on a challenge to
such a statute.171 Appellants challenged the statute on the grounds that it gave
incumbents an advantage violative of the First Amendment.172 The court
explicitly applied the lower level of scrutiny generally applicable to
contribution limits and found that Appellants did not present any evidence that
the limitation disadvantaged challengers, because challengers could decide to
run for office and raise campaign funds “years in advance of any election.”173
The court found that the fact that challengers may decide to run later in the
election cycle was not a result of the restriction at issue.174 The same logic
applies to the variable contribution limits proposed in this Article.
A.

Variable Contribution Limits Based on Speaker

Just as contributions given and received in the first half of election cycles
can more clearly give rise to corruption or its appearance than contributions
given in the second half of election cycles, states, the federal government, and

170. In Minnesota, candidates were limited to the following contribution limits: governor and
lieutenant governor together, $2,000 in an election year and $500 in other years; attorney general,
$1,000 in an election year and $200 in other years; secretary of state or state auditor, $500 in an
election year and $100 in other years; state senator, $500 in an election year and $100 in other
years; and state representative, $500 in an election year and $100 in the other year. MINN. STAT.
§ 10A.27 (2005).
171. 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005).
172. Id. at 1113.
173. Id. at 1114. The Kelley Court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling which upheld
Montana’s campaign finance program, under which the contribution limit doubled if a candidate
ran in a contested primary. Id. (citing Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddelman, 343 F.3d 1085,
1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Ninth Circuit had rejected the argument that variable
contribution limits impermissibly discriminated against challengers for two reasons. Eddleman,
343 F.3d at 1096. First, the state law prevented incumbents from using leftover funds from one
campaign in a future campaign. Id. at 1095. Second, the court held that “without a record of
‘invidious discrimination against challengers as a class,’ there is ‘no support for the proposition
that an incumbent’s advantages [are] leveraged into something significantly more powerful by
contribution limitations applicable to all candidates, whether veterans or upstarts.’” Id. at 1096
(alteration in original) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, at 389 n.4
(2000)).
174. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1096.
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the courts have recognized that contributions from certain contributors may
pose a unique threat to the integrity of electoral and governmental processes.
Therefore, some jurisdictions have imposed contribution limits that vary based
on the identity of the contributor. Government contractors, lobbyists, members
of regulated industries, and political committees have been either barred from
giving contributions or subject to lower contributions limits that the rest of the
public.175 In most cases, these contributors are prohibited from giving any
contributions, while the rest of the public remains free to give up to the
contribution limit.176
For instance, many states have imposed outright bans on contributions
from or solicitations to lobbyists or state contractors.177 Lobbyists are hired to
persuade public officials to make governmental decisions favorable to the
lobbyists’ clients.178 The risk for corruption is great, since the lobbyists’
clients—government contractors—depend on government decisions for their
livelihood.179
Over a dozen states impose campaign finance restrictions aimed at
lobbyists.180 The most common, a ban on lobbyists’ contributions while the
legislature is in session, frequently faces constitutional challenge.181 Many
courts uphold campaign contribution restrictions which focus only on
lobbyists, such as bans on lobbyist contributions during legislative sessions.182

175. See, e.g., Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F.
Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding statute governing lobbyists); Gwinn v. State
Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ga. 1993) (upholding statute governing insurers); In re
Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d 918, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (upholding statute
prohibiting state agencies from awarding contracts for more than $17,500 to businesses that
contributed more than $300 to a campaign); Gard v. Wis. State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809,
812 (Wis. 1990) (upholding statute capping the amount of funding a candidate may receive from
all committees).
176. See, e.g., Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (lobbyists); Gwinn,
426 S.E.2d at 891 n.1 (insurers); In re Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d at 920 (businesses); Gard,
456 N.W.2d at 812 (political committees).
177. Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 78, at 218–19 (listing examples).
178. See Jason D. Kaune, Note, Exporting Ethics: Lessons from Russia’s Attempt to Regulate
Federal Lobbying, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 815, 820–21 (1997) (“[B]usiness
lobbyists routinely contribute to campaign coffers in order to gain access to public officials. In
other words, while the essence of the lobbyist’s job is to convince, not contribute, many lobbyists
perceive that they must pay to play an effective role in the policymaking process.”) (citation
omitted).
179. See FEC v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (upholding a section of the
FECA that prohibited government contractors from making certain political contributions).
180. Briffault, supra note 19, at 120.
181. Id. at 121 (citing cases from Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, and Missouri).
182. See Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations in State
Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW 375, 396–97 (2008).
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For instance, such prohibitions were upheld in Bartlett,183 Alaska Civil
Liberties Union,184 and Kimbell v. Hooper.185 Instead of imposing outright
bans, however, legislatures could limit the influence of lobbyists and state
contractors by setting lower contribution limits for those individuals.186
In Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices
Commission, for instance, a federal district court in California upheld a
prohibition on contributions by lobbyists to both non-incumbent and
incumbent candidates.187 The court explicitly applied the lower standard of
review applicable to restrictions on contributions.188 Significantly, the court
declared that:
[A] ban on contributions is not per se illegal. . . . [T]he test for determining the
validity of the amount of a limitation (here a complete ban) is whether the limit
is “so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources
189
necessary for effective advocacy.”

The court found no evidence demonstrating that candidates had trouble seeking
office without personal contributions from registered lobbyists.190
Some states also place special limitations on political committees, both the
size of the contributions they can receive and the size of the contributions they
can give to candidates.191 Contribution limits or bans are placed on political
committees as a way to limit the influence of special interests who routinely
contribute both directly to candidates and indirectly to political committees,
which then make donations to candidates.192 Hence, placing limits on political
committees prevents special interest groups from being able to make an end
run around contribution limits to candidates.
In addition, some states prohibit only certain contributors, such as
members of a regulated industry (i.e. insurance companies), from giving to
certain candidates, such as the regulators of that industry (i.e. Commissioners

183. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 718 (4th Cir. 1999).
184. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 620 (Alaska 1999).
185. 665 A.2d 41, 45 (Vt. 1995).
186. Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 78, at 219.
187. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001). The law in question specifically applies to
lobbyists registered to lobby the governmental agency for which the officeholder works or for
which the candidate seeks election. Id. at 1190.
188. Id. at 1191.
189. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (emphasis in
original).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203(e) (2007). But see Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding previous version of Arkansas law unconstitutional).
192. Gard v. Wis. State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 823 (Wis. 1990).
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of Insurance).193 Courts have generally upheld narrow prohibitions on
contributions by a regulated entity to the regulator.194
The same logic which has led courts to uphold complete prohibitions on
contributions from certain contributors, applies with equal force to what is
arguably a lesser restriction on First Amendment rights—variable contribution
limit systems. Those systems impose lower contribution limits when elections
are far away, candidates need less money to effectively advocate for
themselves, and the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance is at its height. Candidates can competitively run for office under
the variable contribution limits proposed in this Article.
B.

Variable Contribution Limits: Publicly v. Privately Funded Candidates

Under some campaign finance systems, contribution limits applicable to
candidates who accept public financing are higher than those limits applicable
to privately financed candidates. Candidates who accept public funding to run
for office are seen as less susceptible to corruption than candidates who are
completely funded from private contributions.195 In a sense, the more private
money a candidate receives, the more risk there is of corrupting that candidate.
For this reason, and as an incentive to opt into public financing programs,
publicly financed candidates are sometimes subject to higher individual
contribution limits than their privately financed opponents.196
For instance, in Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,197 the First Circuit upheld a
challenge to a contribution “cap gap,” under which contributions to privately
financed candidates were limited to $1,000 per donor, but contributions to
publicly financed candidates were permissible up to $2,000 per donor.198 The
court rejected two challenges to the “cap gap”: first, that the disparity was per
se impermissible; and second that the “cap gap” impermissibly burdened the
First Amendment rights of privately financed candidates, as it failed to serve a
compelling governmental interest.199
The court found that even if the “cap gap” did burden a privately financed
candidate’s First Amendment rights, it would survive strict scrutiny.200 Citing
to Buckley, the court found that public financing programs “‘facilitate

193. See, e.g., Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890, 891 n.1 (Ga. 1993).
194. See id. See also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding
provision governing securities regulators); Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So. 2d
494, 509 (La. 2002) (upholding provision governing donations to casino regulators).
195. Cf. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993).
196. See, e.g., id. at 37 n.13.
197. Id. at 26.
198. Id. at 37 n.13, 39–40.
199. Id. at 39.
200. Vote Choice, Inc., 4 F.3d at 39.
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communication by candidates with the electorate,’ free candidates from the
pressures of fundraising, and, relatedly, tend to combat corruption.”201
VI. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF DAVIS V. FEC
Even though the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC202 dealt
with variable contribution limits, that decision does not address the issue
discussed in this Article. In Davis, the Court struck down a portion of the
FECA, known as the “Millionaire’s Amendment,” as invalid under the First
Amendment.203 The “Millionaire’s Amendment” tripled the contribution limit
applicable to a candidate who did not self-finance her own campaign—going
from $2300 to $6900—if that candidate ran against a candidate who did selffinance his campaign and spent at least $350,000 of her own funds on the
campaign.204 The non-self-financing candidate could enjoy the less-stringent
individual contribution limits until she raised $350,000—at which point the
lower contribution limits were revived.205
The Court found that this program violated the self-financed candidate’s
First Amendment rights, acting as an impermissible limit on a candidate’s
expenditure of his own funds in support of his campaign.206 Specifically, the
Court held that a wealthy self-financed candidate might not want to continue
spending his own money above the triggering threshold because it would
provide a benefit to that candidate’s opponent.207
Under the proposal discussed in this Article, candidates competing against
each other would be treated the same. There would be no “asymmetrical”

201. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
202. 554 U.S. 724, 728 (2008).
203. Id. at 729, 744–45.
204. Id. at 729.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 738. The Court held that while the statute did not cap a candidate’s use of his own
funds, “it impose[d] an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercise[d] that
First Amendment right.” Id. at 739.
207. The statute at issue
require[d] a candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in
unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. Many
candidates who [could] afford to make large personal expenditures to support their
campaigns may choose to do so despite [the statute], but they [would] shoulder a special
and potentially significant burden if they [made] that choice . . . .
. . . [A] candidate who wishe[d] to exercise that right [to self-finance had] two choices:
abide by a limit on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that right
by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits.
Id. at 739–40.
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scheme at play, as there was in Davis.208 As noted in at least one court, the
Davis decision concerned situations in which candidates for one election, and
not their contributors, subjected to different limits.209 The Davis Court’s
decision takes nothing away from this Article’s discussion of variable
contribution limits based on the speaker’s identity or whether the candidates
opts into a public financing program as lending support to the constitutionality
of temporal variable contribution limits.
CONCLUSION
With the mistaken belief that temporal bans on campaign contributions are
expenditure limits in disguise, many courts have erroneously applied strict
scrutiny to such limits.210 Some temporal limits on campaign contributions
pose too severe of a burden on First Amendment rights and should be struck
down, others are closely drawn to serve the important governmental interest of
preventing corruption or its appearance and should be upheld. Whether such
bans should be upheld or invalidated, however, courts must be intellectually
honest and apply the lower level of scrutiny applicable to restrictions on the
size of campaign contributions, when analyzing temporal restrictions on
campaign contributions.
When applying this lower level of scrutiny, courts must refrain from
overestimating the burden these restrictions place on the First Amendment
rights of candidates and contributors, as well as underestimating the
government’s interest. Many temporal restrictions on campaign contributions
still allow candidates to amass the resources necessary to effectively advocate
for themselves. Further, when temporal restrictions are in place, supporters
remain free to support candidates through means that do not require the use of
money or through the use of independent expenditures which support or
oppose a candidate. Finally, temporal bans can serve the government’s interest
in preserving the integrity of electoral and governmental processes by
preventing money from flowing directly to candidates during time periods seen
to be uniquely susceptible to corruption or its appearance.
Some things remain clear. Off-year contribution bans are typically struck
down. Legislative session bans are struck down, with the exception of some
208. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 729. The Court noted that if the statute at issue had “simply
raised the contribution limits for all candidates, Davis’ argument would [have] plainly fail[ed].”
Id. at 737.
209. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Davis, 544
U.S. at 738) (“We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other.”). The Ognibene Court
distinguished Davis from other cases upholding disparate contribution limits on contributors. Id.
(citing In re Earle Asphalt, 950 A.2d 918, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Blount v. SEC,
61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
210. See Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1524–25 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
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bans which only limit contributions by lobbyists and PACs. Post-election bans
are generally upheld. Restrictions that cover non-incumbent challengers may
raise increased concerns about the burden that these restrictions place on First
Amendment rights. Bans (unless targeted at certain contributors) are more
constitutionally problematic than limits.
Recognizing that the courts may not change the way they analyze current
temporal contribution restrictions, this Article also proposes a different way to
limit the influence of money in campaigns and argues that states and the
federal government should enact, and courts should uphold, variable
contribution limits based on the time when contributions are made and
received. Under the program proposed in this Article, per election contribution
limits would remain the same, but contribution limits during the first half of an
election cycle would be lowered to one third of the total limit. For instance, if
the overall contribution limit for a four year cycle is $2400, a contributor could
give a candidate no more than $800 in the first two years of the election cycle.
The contributor could then give $1600 in the last two years of the cycle. This
proposal would limit political fundraising when it is least needed, in the
beginning of an election cycle, and when it is most likely to result in actual or
apparent corruption. Candidates would remain free to accept, and contributors
would remain free to give, the same per election contributions that they
otherwise could. The only change would be a shift in when campaign
contributions could be made and received. The proposal set forth in this
Article would serve the government’s interests with minimal infringement on
the First Amendment rights of candidates and contributors.
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